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Privatization: value system of the government
There can be no transition from a command-
administrative to market economy without 
privatization. Privatization has always been an 
instrument that tackles a number of issues starting 
from reconstruction of the economy and rise of its 
effectiveness to a boost of individual enterprises’ 
production. However, complexity and scale of 
privatization in Belarus have sometimes led to er-
rors, miscalculations, failures and corruption. The 
problem has been frequently aggravated by the fact 
that privatization in the CIS and CEE countries is a 
‘killer’ of inefficient and loss-making industry set-
tled during the era of socialism. Such an economy 
and its volume becomes merely redundant under 
the new economic conditions.  
The government of Belarus has used challenges 
and errors made during the process of privatization 
to stop it. Favourable conditions in raw materials’ 
market (potassium, oil products), customs union 
with Russia and its subsidies enabled the authorities 
to modernize many of Belarusian plants and claim 
the effectiveness of state ownership. As a result, by 
2009 but less than a third of the country’s enterprises 
were turned into joint-stock companies (JSC)1. 
Moreover, the very idea of privatization in Belarus 
has been substituted with the concept ‘transforma-
tion of an enterprise into a JSC’ (corporatization). 
As a result, enterprises undergoing reformation 
were merely changing their patterns of ownership 
by turning into JSC. The state owns over 75% of 
shares in 70% of newly-formed JSC, and as little as 
10% of all Belarusian JSC do not have government’s 
share in their stock capital (all of them had been 
set up prior to 1996). 
Furthermore, the state keeps actively interfering into 
operative, investment, personnel, and price policy 
of corporatized business using administrative and 
legal leverages. Thus a conflict over the price policy 
of mobile service providers arose in 2009: after the 
devaluation of the Belarusian rouble by nearly 30%, 
1  A change of the legal status of an enterprise into a joint-stock 
company is the first step in the process of privatization in Belarus: 
a unitary state enterprise changes its legal status, forms its author-
ized capital, sets a number and a nominal price of its stock and 
etc. The state becomes the owner of 100% of the newly formed 
enterprise’s shares.  Just after the change of the legal status of an 
enterprise the state decides about the selling of its certain stock 
package.     
Although summertime lets us relax and enjoy 
the calm in politics, the Bell continues to be pu-
blished. For summer rhythm and the scarcity of 
events allow us to analyse in depth political and 
economic developments in Belarus. Therefore, in 
the present issue you’ll find the contribution by 
Elena Rakova presenting the history and analysis 
of privatization process in Belarus. The article is 
relevant with respect to the recent IMF statement 
warning Belarus to make more efforts while 
negotiating the provision of the Russian credit. 
According to the IMF, Russian credit is vital for 
Belarus in order to avoid economic complications. 
The other advice given by the Fund is to prepare 
state owned enterprises for privatization. 
It seems likely that the official Minsk will listen 
to these advices. Probably as it has listened to 
the inducement made by the American delega-
tion. During the official visit to Minsk American 
Congressmen and Senators urged the Belarusian 
leader to free the American citizen convicted in 
Belarus for the alleged industrial espionage and 
the use of fake documents. The topic of Belarus-
USA relation is analysed in detail in the article by 
Alena Daneika.   
Taking the chance, I wish you pleasant and inspi-
rational summer holiday.    
Julija Narkeviciute, Editor 
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both operators – MTS and Velcom - increased their 
rates. The government reacted immediately by 
‘recommending’ to return to former prices. MTS, 
controlling interest of which belongs to the state, 
obeyed whereas Velcom, that belongs to Telecom 
Austria, started a debate and launched negotiations 
with the government seeking to find a compromise. 
The government interferes in activities of other 
JSC as well, thus infringing the interests of private 
owners (for example, those of Gazprom that has 
stocks of Beltransgaz). 
It would be wrong to assume that investors from 
both the East and the West did not express interest 
in Belarusian businesses. However, the leadership 
of the country imposed a number of conditions 
for privatization deals (irremovability of the staff, 
sustension of social infrastructure, nomenclature 
and production volume) that lead to the absense 
of applicants. For example, a number of enter-
prises of chemical and petrochemical industry 
were transformed into JSC and prepared for 
privatization in 2002, though they never ‘found’ 
their new owners. 
Ideological beliefs of the authorities contributed 
significantly to the prevalence of state-owned 
property in Belarus. In authorities’ point of view, 
state-owned property can be as efficiently managed 
as private. As a result, entire branches of industry 
were prepared for privatization but still continued 
to be run by the state. Among those branches were 
petroleum refinement (2003), beer (2006), cement 
and confectionery industries (2007)2. This was pos-
sible since the economic situation in the country 
allowed to give priority to state ownership that 
constituted the basis of the socio-economic model 
of the country. 
Energy shock and change of values
The year 2007 became a turining point in the 
government’s attitude towards privatization. The 
reasons for the change were solely economic. The 
price of Russian gas doubled and a customs duty 
on Russian oil was introduced. As a consequence, 
the trade balance that never had a significant net 
surplus, plunged into minus. To restore the balance 
the authorities undertook several demonstrative 
sales that brought over 1.2 bn USD into the budget 
(see Table 1). To compare, in 2006 the budget 
received 0.03 mln USD. Beltransgaz was sold at 
a particularly good price of 2.5 bn USD. It can be 
explained as a political desire of Russian authori-
ties to take control over Belarusian transit. To sum 
up, privatization in 2007 was implemented behind 
closed doors. It can be characterized by the absense 
of discussions and tenders (virtually all deals were 
filed under the President’s decrees) and sales to 
foreign enterprises. 
2008: unfulfilled  expectations
In 2008, both the authorities and potential inves-
tors were sharply disillusioned due to the mutual 
2  The so-called ‘milk’ war between Russia and Belarus in June 2009 
is explained by an alleged objective of Russian companies to ac-
quire a portfolio of 12 Belarusian milk processing plants and Be-
larus’s reluctance to sell them. 
overestimated expectations. Early in the year there 
were talks that the country’s property was being 
‘prepared for sale’ since the trade balance still had 
problems. The demand for potential Belarusian 
holdings was examined and a number of major 
deals was being planned. In the middle of the year 
the world saw a peak of prices for assets. Naturally, 
the authorities expected significant profits from 
sales. However, as early as in the fall of 2008 the 
global financial crisis kissed all these plans and 
expectations goodbye. 
Still, over the year, the government maintained 
investors’ expectations by making remarkable 
changes in legislation. As a result, the provision 
of the ‘golden share’ was abolished, other steps 
intended to liberalize the stock market were made, 
the three-year privatization programme was passed 
and the corporatization process intensified. While in 
2007 there were as few as 5 corporatized enterprises, 
the number grew to 156 in 2008. Among the newly 
established JSC there were many potentially inter-
esting enterprises in machinery, military-industrial 
complex, and chemical industry. Yet the most ‘in-
teresting’ enterprises were labeled as strategic, i.e. 
banned from privatization. Moreover, the authorities 
have repeatedly stated their readiness to sell as little 
as 25 % of shares at the first stage while imposing 
tight conditions on potential owners. 
As a result, there was only one notable privatizion 
deal completed in 2008. 85% of shares of the mobile 
service provider BeST (the third largest in Belarus) 
were sold to a turkish enterprise. 
Other negotiations, ranging from selling the control-
ling interest of two major state banks to European 
counterparts to selling MAZ to O. Deripaska’s 
agencies, were practically stopped or cancelled due 
to the global crisis. 
In summary, Belarus carried out case-by-case priva-
tization in 2007-2008, several deals brought remark-
able revenues into the country. The authorities grew 
confident in the liquidity and existing demand for 
Belarusian assets. In addition, the basket of shares 
intended for distribution varied from 1% to 100%, 
yet for different price. The geographical whereabouts 
of new owners differ greatly as well. 
2009: forced privatization? 
The prospects of Belarusian privatization remain 
unclear for the year 2009. In accordance with the 
approved three-year privatization programme ac-
tive corporatization is to be continued. However, 
this policy does not presuppose mass sale of state 
shares to private investors. The authorities insist on 
solely fiscal approach that presupposes receiving of 
maximum benefit. As the  President has repeatedly 
stated (namely the President dictates the tone and 
the speed of privatization in the country), ‘nobody 
will sell anything at an easy rate, for crisis prices’. The 
authorities do not trust private property, preferring 
to distribute to investors as little as 25% of shares 
(‘one should work a couple of years first, and then 
we will see’). They do not consider privatization as 
a reorganization instrument of outdated businesses 
and economy as a whole. One will barely find pri-
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Privatization will not 
become massive in 
2009. Yet the pressure 
on the balance of 
payment due to the 
deterioration of 
export and external 
pressure of creditors 
will whip it up all the 
time. 
vatization in the package of anti-crisis measures. 
Rather, the means to develop small and medium 
businesses and the support of large state businesses 
are viewed as main instruments. Given the global 
economic crisis, the efficiency of such approach 
raises doubts since, as the crisis aggravates, the 
profitability and potential value of Belarusian busi-
nesses is declining while financial resources in the 
world are still in deficit.  
Despite all these complexities, however, there is an 
intrigue developing around Belarusian privatization. 
On the one hand, there is a conflict with Russia. Rus-
sia prefers to take a more active part in Belarusian 
privatization (petrochemicals, dairy, meat plants). 
On the other hand, the rest of the world is pushing 
for privatization (the EU and particularly the IMF 
which, under the conditions of granting a badly 
needed stand-by credit to Belarus, keeps gradually 
imposing new terms.3 and forces the government 
to implement market reforms). 
3  Recently the Executive Council of the IMF has completed its first 
review in the framework of an agreement on “stand-by” credit for 
Belarus The conclusions reveal that the Fund not only approved 
the factual allotment of credit in the amount of 679,2 mln USD, 
but had increased the amount of financial support up to 3,52 bn 
USD.  The IMF anticipates Belarus will pass a new law on priva-
tization and set up a privatization agency to implement the ‘am-
bitious’ program in this sphere. 
One can state with confidence that in 2009 privati-
zation will not be transparent and will proceed on 
the case-by-case basis. Most likely (if the relations 
between Belarus and Russia do not grow sour once 
and for all) the largest Russia’s state bank Sberbank 
will acquire the controlling interest of the third-large 
Belarusian bank BPS-Bank (although its sale was 
previously intended for a large European bank). 
Deals are likely in the insurance sector as well as 
in petrochemicals and machinery. However, the 
deals will be made either under powerful external 
pressure, or as a last resort. 
Meanwhile, the thesis of ‘nomenclature privatiza-
tion’ will hardly be proven out, since the authorities 
need currency too badly to let the state property 
go. Rather, the nomenclature will keep raising its 
capitals by issuing permissions and engaging in 
other control and regulatory activities. 
Privatization will not become massive in 2009. Yet 
the pressure on the balance of payment due to the 
deterioration of export and external pressure of 
creditors will whip it up all the time. Thus econom-
ics will catalyze both political and market reforms 
in the country. Therefore, 2010 may see significant 
changes happen in Belarus.
Mobile operator Velcom (31%)
JSC Berezovski kombinat 
silikatnyh izdelii (100%) 
Beltransgaz shares2 (12.5%)
Belvnesheconombank (47.4%)
Motovelo (99.7%)
Belschettechnika (30.1%)
Mobile operator BeST (80%)
ATEP-5 (1.51%)
Beltransgaz (12.5%)
Orbita-Service (26.78%)
Experemental plan named after 
Gastelo (49%)
BelOMO-Stroi (51%) 
Red October (91.25%)
Telecom SB-Telecom1, Cyprus 
Telecom Turkcell, Turkey
Gas transit Gazprom, Russia
Gas transit Gazprom, Russia
Machinery  7.2  ATEC Holding GmbH, Austria 
Machinery  JSC Amkodor, Belarus 
Shoes production Ltd. Marko (Belarus)
Banking sector Vnesheconombank, (VEB) Russia 
Metallurgy Dainova Ltd., (Ukraine-Russia-Great Britain JV)        
Transportation Norvegijas Riepas, Latvia 
Repairing of home radio 
electronics  FE Elitepartner, Belarus-Ukraine  
Cash registers production Vanjes Holdings Ltd, Cyprus 
Construction
556 
500 
625
625
1.08  
0.084
24.1
2.815
0.21 
0.187  
0.21
0.15Triple Ltd, Belarus
Table 1. Main privatization deals in 2007-2008. 
Amount of 
deal, USD mln.The buyer
The name of privatized enter-
prise (share sold) 2007 
Industry  
2008
Source: The State property Fund. 
1     In October 2007 Cyprus SB-Telecom sold Belarusian package to Telekom Austria for .EUR 535 m.
2   According to the signed contract, Gazprom annually buys 12.5% of Beltransgaz shares for 625 mln USD till 2011 
(50% shares for 2.5 bn USD). 
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B e l a r u s - u s a :  r e g i m e  s t i l l  i n 
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Alena Daneika, Analytical center 
Wider Europe, www.w-europe.org
For the first time in the last decade, Belarus was 
paid an official visit by a representative delegation 
of American Congressmen. The guests expressed 
their gratitude to the Belarusian authorities for the 
possibility to visit the country. Herewith the vital 
importance of the Act on the Democracy in Belarus 
was not forgotten, hopes for democratic changes 
in Belarus were stressed. Thus, it was implied that 
the development of the Belarusian-American rela-
tionship is possible only on condition of systemic 
reforms in Belarus.
It has been less than a year since Belarusian and 
Western analysts voiced their doubts regarding 
the possibility of radical changes in Belarus-USA 
relationship under the present Belarusian leadership. 
In the fall 2008 to my question whether an official 
visit of American representatives to Belarus was 
feasible, Chargé d’Affairs ad interim of the United 
States in Belarus Jonathan Moore replied that in 
the near foreseeable future that could hardly be 
expected. The visit of the solid delegation of the 
American Congressmen to Minsk that took place 
in late June 2009, however, enables to speak about 
the possibility of changes in the American attitude 
towards Belarus.
 The obvious reasons for that could be the following. 
First, the alteration of the attitude of the EU that in 
the wake of the Georgian-Russian war became ter-
rified by Russia surrounding its borders. Second, it 
has been acknowledged that the policy of sanctions 
failed to be fruitful. Finally, encouragement of the 
official Minsk in its attempts to create at least the 
semblance of democratization has played its role.
Deeds, not words are being expected from  
A. Lukashenka
The delegation was headed by Senator Benjamin 
Carden, Chairman of the Congress of Helsinki 
Commission, Congressman Christopher Smith, 
Chief representative of the Republican Party within 
the Helsinki Commission and Senator Richard J. 
Durbin, assistant of the leader of the majority of 
the Democratic Party in the Senate. Benjamin 
Carden titled the very fact of the visit as a proof of 
the United States’ interest in the dialogue.
During the meeting with the President A. Lukash-
enka, the Congressmen stated that Belarus failed 
to meet international standards and discharge 
obligations it had assumed in the sphere of the basic 
rights and freedoms. Still, Congressman Doggett 
stressed the very fact of A. Lukashenka talking 
about the necessity to eliminate barriers existing 
between the two countries was highly positive. Yet 
the Belarusian leader was not able to name any bar-
rier that could be removed. Instead, A. Lukashenka 
simply denied the human rights violations that he 
is being reproached with. 
The possibility to support Belarus economically 
was discussed during the meeting. However, it 
was pointed out that the scope of support would 
depend on concrete steps made by the Belarusian 
authorities. Hereby it was made clear that America 
cannot be taken in by mere promises. ‘Words are 
great but deeds are much better’ – Christopher 
Smith summed up. 
So far, the only outcome of this visit is the protocol 
on the intention to revise the bilateral relationship. 
The given protocol is appended by the list of mutual 
pretences, expectations and conditions. Meanwhile 
the indirect outcome of the visit was the release 
the American citizen Emmanuel Zeltser pardoned 
personally by the President. Mr. Zeltser due to 
widely known reasons despairingly needed help 
and the Congressmen helped him out. In fact, the 
given symbolical gesture may show the nature of 
the political system of the USA: the state protects 
concrete rights of a concrete person. To offer a hand 
to the person, publicly named as the last dictator in 
Europe, to free the American citizen. Why not?
Belarus is the country where everything is  
possible
In his last interview, Chargé d’Affairs ad interim of 
the United States in Belarus Jonathan Moore spoke 
about a solid foundation for the development of 
the Belarus-USA relation that the new American 
administration is highly interested in. It was not for 
nothing that the official Minsk greeted the choice 
of Americans: in this sense, Barack Obama is a 
much more attractive figure than his rival in the 
pre-election campaign John McCain. The latter 
was rather tough when it came to the Belarusian 
leadership.
Still, it becomes increasingly clear that the idyll in the 
Belarus-USA relations can hardly be feasible due to 
the underlying differences in historical experience 
and the absence of understanding of democratic 
traditions in the mass conscience of Belarusians. 
Long years might be necessary to awaken the in-
terest in and the need for democratic procedures 
in Belarus. Another issue is whether the alteration 
of the internal political situation of Belarus may be 
accelerated through contacts in the field of science, 
education and culture.
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Talking about culture, the traditional musical festival 
Ambasovisha, traditionally held on the initiative of 
the US Embassy in Belarus, is worth mentioning. 
Greeting the participants at the Ambassador’s resi-
dence where the event took place, Jonathan Moore 
said: ‘Belarus is the country where anything may 
happen’. Whether these words were a demonstration 
of American optimism, or a pleasant diplomatic 
gesture of the outgoing diplomat, it is for you to 
decide.  More important is the fact that Mr. Moore, 
host the festival, taught the participants a small les-
son in democracy. Having his own likings for the 
competitors, Mr. Moore did not participate in the 
poll and deliberately chose the role of an observer. 
Although quite amusing compared with the actual 
political campaigns, the poll was organized in strict 
accordance with democratic standards. The winner 
was elected by the majority of votes. Groups that 
had never been paid attention by mass media took 
part in the competition. In this way, comparatively 
small, basically young listeners were shown the 
advantages of a free choice.
Excursus into the History of Belarus-USA  
Relations
First steps
The USA recognized the sovereignty of the Republic 
of Belarus in 1991. The same year diplomatic rela-
tions were established. In early 1992, the Embassy 
of the USA was opened in Minsk, which was, by 
the way, the first foreign diplomatic representa-
tive office in Belarus of the given dimension. Joint 
declaration on the intention to consolidate the 
cooperation between both countries was signed 
during the visit of the Chairman of the Presidium 
of the Supreme Council Stanislav Shushkievich 
to the USA. In January 1994, the President of the 
USA Bill Clinton paid an official visit to Belarus. 
Permanent visits of the heads of the foreign affairs 
and defence departments of both countries’ gov-
ernments took place. In autumn 1995, President 
A. Lukashenka visited the USA on the occasion 
of the 50th anniversary of the UN.
It has to be noted that the USA assisted Belarus in 
the implementation of the programme on liquida-
tion of strategic offensive arms and reconstruction 
of the defence industry. USA assisted Belarus in 
reduction of nuclear threat possibility under the 
agreement signed in 1992. 123 mln USD were 
allocated to Belarus under the given agreement. 
Cooperation of Belarusian and American military 
servicemen commenced within the framework of 
the NATO programme Partnership for Peace which 
Belarus acceded to in 1995 and continues to be its 
member to the present day.
Economics
Along with diplomatic contacts economic relations 
have been developed. In April 1992, the USA granted 
Belarus the status of the most-favoured-nation. 
Almost a year away, the agreement on trade and 
economic cooperation entered into force. Belarus 
was included into the list of countries that enjoyed 
custom concessions under the Generalized System 
of Preferences of the USA. The system enabled 
Belarus to export goods to the USA at reduced 
custom rates or even custom free. In 1995, the 
inter-governmental committee on the facilitation of 
the development of American business in Belarus 
started its activities. Later on the Agreement on 
the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Invest-
ments entered into force. Such famous companies 
as Coca-Cola, McDonald and Ford Motor came 
to Belarus.
Development of Situation in Figures
In 1993, the share of the Belarusian export to the 
USA amounted to 5 .2%, that of the Belarusian im-
port – to 8.2%. In the beginning of the 90s, the USA 
was the leader among foreign investors in Belarus. 
In 1993, the USA held the third position in the list 
of the countries setting up joint ventures in Belarus, 
allowing only Poland and Germany have the first 
two positions. Meantime in 2008, the USA held the 
11th position among the trade partners of Belarus 
(CIS not included) and the 17th among exporters 
of Belarusian goods. Commodity circulation made 
up 2% of Belarusian foreign trade.
However, it should be noted that before the Act on 
Democracy in Belarus (2004) was enacted, political 
controversies did not affect the development of 
economic relations.
From Declarations to the Act on Democracy
Controversies in Belarus-USA relations after 1995 
grew alongside with the changes of the internal 
political situation in Belarus. In 1996, the USA 
refused to recognize the results of the referendum 
that legalized the amendments and the supplements 
to the Constitution of Belarus. America did not 
recognize the authority of the National Assem-
bly formed after the dissolution of the Supreme 
Council of the 13th convocation. Belarus accused 
the USA of interference into its internal affairs. In 
February 1997, strict criticism of the situation in 
Belarus appeared in the discourse of American 
diplomats. Notions ‘self-isolation’, ‘disregard of 
the accepted international obligations’, ‘breach 
of the accepted standards of democracy’ started 
to prevail. Contacts with official representatives 
of Belarus were gradually cancelled. Meanwhile, 
relations with representatives of the opposition, 
NGOs and independent mass media were being 
developed. An attempt to normalize the relations 
was made by the American party in 1997, however, 
unsuccessfully. 
A story of the eviction of American diplomats, 
including the Ambassador, from their residence 
in Drozdy under the pretext of canalization repairs 
turned into a big scandal. American diplomats left 
Belarusian capital for that time being. Only in 1999, 
the problem of the new residence was resolved and 
the Ambassador of the USA to Belarus resumed his 
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office. By that time it was nearly two years that the 
Congress was debating the ‘the Belarusian issue’.  
The results of all electoral campaigns, organized 
in Belarus after the referendum in 1996, were not 
recognized by the American Administration. The 
Belarusian authorities were pointed to the absence 
of the freedoms of speech and meeting, dependence 
of the judicial system on the authorities, repressions 
against otherwise-minded in politics and religion, 
uninvestigated disappearances of famous politi-
cians and flaws in the electoral legislation. Over 
time, the list of pretences and expectations was 
growing longer. The apogee of dissention between 
the USA and Belarus must have been the Act on 
Democracy in Belarus signed by the President 
George W. Bush in December 2004. The document 
was a reaction of the USA to the violation of human 
rights in Belarus.
The first draft of the Act on Democracy in Belarus 
appeared in 2001. The law provided for the economic 
sanctions and measures to terminate contacts with 
the official Minsk. In particular, it interdicted any 
governmental agency to provide the Belarusian 
authorities with any form of financial assistance. 
The document prohibited any strategic export to 
Belarus with the exception of humanitarian aid 
and expenditures on democratic activities. The 
representatives of the USA in international or-
ganizations were told to vote against any assistance 
to Belarus. The Act contains requirements to the 
Belarusian authorities as well. It was demanded 
to release all political and religious prisoners, to 
lift politically motivated accusations against the 
oppositionists, to investigate the disappearance of 
the Belarusian opposition members, to cancel all 
forms of intimidation and repressions against the 
opposition, independent mass media, trade unions 
and NGOs and to hold free and fair presidential 
and parliament elections. The Act on Democracy in 
Belarus was adopted by the Congress in 2004 and 
given two years validity that was extended twice. 
In 2006, it was signed by G. W. Bush, this year – by 
B. Obama. The greatest knock for the Belarusian 
authorities, however, was the decision to expand 
the economic sanctions, particularly, to the concern 
Belneftexim. Such sanctions threatened with direct 
and considerable losses and therefore became the 
reason of a full scale diplomatic war that broke out 
in early 2008.
Namely 2008 was titled by Jonathan Moore as the 
worst phase in the mutual relation. It was the phase 
of economic sanctions and mutual decrease of 
diplomatic missions. 30 of 35 American diplomats, 
including the Ambassador, had to leave Belarus. Mr. 
Moore defined everything that happened later as 
‘minor but nonetheless growth’.
Irrespective of the fact that the validity of the Act 
on Democracy has never been cancelled (and it was 
reminded to the Belarusian side during the visit) 
America has softened its stance. The fact that the 
IMF granted a loan to Belarus is the best prove: it 
would have been impossible without America’s 
approval. According to the statements made by the 
Congressman Smith in Minsk the anomaly remained 
as it was, irrespective of some cosmetic changes. 
Yet the situation has changed and the Americans 
must have decided to try to talk. 
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